Friday, February 20, 2015

Is Sri Lanka a Fragile State?

"The question for Sri Lanka’s new government is whether Sri Lankans are a bunch of fragilistas who default to thinking that what they do not  see is not there, or what they do not  understand does not exist.  Are they predictable? Do they mistake the unknown for the non-existent?"

by Ruwantissa Abeyratne
( February 20, 2015, Montreal, Sri Lanka Guardian)  One hopes not, and  there’s a way to find out.
In an article entitled The Calm Before the Storm published in Foreign Affairs(January/February 2015) authors Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Gregory F. Treverton  give five characteristics that could determine whether a country is fragile or not.  In other words, can a sudden, unexpected circumstance upset and weaken a country to the point of chaos and helplessness.  For starters, the authors cite the diametrically opposed  situations of Lebanon and Syria.  The former looked unstable in the 1970s and 1980s with a raging civil war which culminated with  assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, whereas Syria looked positively stable in spite of an Arab Spring elsewhere in 2011.  President Hafez Assad had ruled for three decades, followed by his son Bashar for a decade.  It appeared as though nothing could shake the Syrian regime.
In a few years, this all changed and Syria is now in ruins whereas Lebanon weathered the storm and came out stable.  The death rate from violence in 2013 in Lebanon was less than that of Washington DC whereas in Syria 100,000  died in the civil war the same year.  The fundamental reason for this turnaround is ascribed to Syria showing only superficial stability whereas Lebanon had weathered many storms before and had become antifragile and robust.  The main reason was : ” Lebanon’s chaos paradoxically signalled strength.  Fifteen years of civil war had served to decentralize the State to bring about a more balanced sectarian power -sharing structure”.  On the other hand Syria’s ruling Baath Party was a top down rigid political structure.  On this basis,  any country which has no diversified interests or a fall back response to a crisis would not sustain itself through an unexpected catastrophe – political, social  or economic – would perish.
Examples given by the authors are China, and Saudi Arabia as fragile States where the former is run by ten powerful persons and has a rigid centralized structure of governance.  There is no multi party political structure.  Saudi Arabia depends entirely on its oil revenues under a monarchical system and that is the only system they know.  Another example is Egypt, which was stable on the outside but had hidden fragility that caved in On the other hand Italy, which has an unpredictable political approach is stable, as well as is Switzerland.
Whether a State is fragile or not is not for history to presuppose but for its underlying structure to determine.  The first symptom of fragility is centralization.  A government which concentrates all its control and governance on a central system would have a weak structure that is incapable of handling disorder. The second marker is the danger posed by bringing ethnic groups together in one system.  The authors cite  scholar  Yaneer Bar-Yam who says that  States having well defined boundaries separating various ethnic groups experience less violence than those that attempt to integrate them.  in other words : ” people are better next door neighbours than roommates”.  Another dangerous characteristic of a fragile State is an undiversified economy where the dependence on one economic resource only would collapse a State should this resource dry up.  An example is tourism as the sole income generator.  This, coupled with the fourth feature – indebtedness – would be disastrous.  The final threat to a fragile State is the lack of experience in surviving shocks. States that experience worse case scenarios tend to develop thick hides that  make them tough and resilient.
In a televised interview some time ago  Taleb gave an appropriate example of fragility using two persons.  Imagine two brothers in London – one  a taxi driver and another an investment banker.  If both lose their demand for  employment in London, the taxi driver could always go to Manchester and continue driving taxis  whereas the investment banker  would find it much more difficult to “fit in” elsewhere.  It is taxi driver’s fragility that a State must have, a good example being Dubai which a few years ago had to be bailed out by Abu Dhabi when it had dumped substantial assets in the real estate market which collapsed.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the bestselling  author of The Black Swan,  in his bookAntifragile states that any system which depends on predictability  and presumption is fragile and that “some things benefit from shocks and they thrive and grow when exposed to volatility, randomness, disorder and stressors”.   According to Taleb black swans (which as we all know are a rarity) are large-scale  unpredictable and irregular events  which can either devastate those that are  fragile and  dependent on a certain rigid stability, or energize risk takers and flexible persons into action.  Antifragility is associated with risk taking and anticipating the unthinkable.
At an interview with CNN in early 2013, Taleb gave the example of Egypt, which caved in under an uprising because they had depended on the only thing they knew – a dictatorship – and were so fragile as to disintegrate into chaos after the fall of the dictator.  Another example cited was China, with an administration of appointed persons where there is  no backup system if the administrative system it solely depends on, somehow fails.  On the other hand he cites Switzerland as antifragile  and survivalist, should political change happen there.
He calls those who comprise a fragile society Fragilistas: ” The fragilista belongs to that category of persons who are in suit and tie, often on Fridays; he faces your jokes with icy solemnity, and tends to develop back problems early in life from sitting at a desk, riding airplanes, and studying newspapers.  He is often involved in a strange ritual, something commonly called “a meeting”.   Now, in addition to these traits, he defaults to thinking that what he doesn’t see is not there, or what he does not understand does not exist.  At the core, he tends to mistake the unknown for the non-existent”.  Taleb introduces the term “epiphenomena”  which is a causal illusion that attributes qualities to a concept, object or person which\who gives the illusion that it\he is responsible for a particular effect.  An example cited is a compass on the bridge of a ship which would give the illusion that it is actually guiding or directing the ship, whereas in reality it is merely reflecting the direction of the ship.
All these arguments resonate a certain gravitas and inexorable credibility. In this context, the question for Sri Lanka’s new government is whether Sri Lankans are a bunch of fragilistas who default to thinking that what they do not  see is not there, or what they do not  understand does not exist.  Are they predictable? Do they mistake the unknown for the non-existent?  Are the people  under the illusion of an epiphenomenon where they  presume that their leaders will effortlessly lead them  through difficult times, when they act as a mere compass that gives the people that causal illusion?  Should the government mesh religious and ethnic groups into one composite society and expect harmony and prosperity? Should they  diversify the Sri Lankan economy to the extent possible?  Should they centralize or de centralize governance?
Some food for thought for the Sirisena-Wickremasinghe government.

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