Short on strategy, long on personal and sectarian partisanship
(Article written before the Common Candidate was picked!)
by Kumar David from The Sunday Island
Political soothsayers say presidential elections are on course for January. I have no idea how Pope Francis’ visit is to be slotted-in, but am certain that Sarath Silva’s constitutional challenge will be seen off irrespective of legal rectitude. The regime did not squander decency and credibility, impeaching, popping up henchmen, and despoiling the higher judiciary for nothing. On the Rajapaksa side, strategy is integrated, unlike the opposition. The tests the regime confronts are circumstances beyond its control. Post-Uva and post-UNHRC, it is more than possible, but less than certain, that President Rajapaksa can be defeated though much depends on how the opposition gets its act together, but the signs are not good. The regime is in better readiness though it has the dilemma of whether to move now and risk being clipped by a year or two, or hang on for a while in worsening circumstances. Its tactical readiness comes from the cohesion of its constituent elements; asses bray in chorus, or you may say they reckon it better to hang-on together than to hang separately.
The disarray in the opposition can be sourced explicitly to fragmentation and implicitly to a deficit of grey matter among political leaders who are unable to get their act together. Some lack the knack for blending ultimate goals (obviously different), with current actions, obviously needing coordination and synchronisation. Let me return to this after crunching some numbers. The numbers-game is mind numbing and wide off the mark at worst; at best it is a rough snapshot to a momentary state of play. But this essay cannot progress without a coarse set of rounded numbers, so here goes.
It appears that post-Uva the UNP can count on a base vote of say 30% from the south – I say south excluding north and east, I do not say Sinhalese. Again in rough and rounded numbers the JVP can haul 6% and Sarath Fonseka 4%. The hard question is how much can the ‘Abolish Executive Presidency’ campaign, sometimes called the ‘Sobitha Movement’ draw, excluding what has already been counted; one must avoid double counting. If you ask me to guess about this as yet untested quantity, I will opt for 5%. If you deem 30%, 6%, 4% and 5% to be on the low side, let me remind you that I mean percentages on a national base. For example, I am saying the UNP core vote, which is located almost entirely outside the north and east, is only 30% of the national vote; of course this is much lower than the percentage it polled in Uva measured on a local scale.
These four numbers add to 45%. Next the Ceylon Tamils and Muslims not already counted in the UNP’s southern 30% (a large number of Muslims and all Ceylon Tamils in the south are already in the 30%). The additional elements are Tamils in the NP and EP, and EP Muslims; safely 10% together. The sum of this potential, but not watertight anti-Rajapaksa vote is 55%; but don’t get excited. Violence and electoral fraud (in this life-and-death gasp of a regime that dare not go out of office) can reduce this by 5%, 10%; I don’t know, your guess is as good as mine. Shall we settle for a potential anti-Rajapaksa vote of between 45% and 55%?
These numbers make sense if you start at the other end too. The Sinhala-Buddhist electorate is about 70% (I have put the bulk of Sinhala Catholics in the UNP camp) and a neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic estimate is that Rajapaksa will take 60% thereof. That is 42% of the national vote; in addition he will (unless Thonda splits) collect most of the 5% Upcountry Tamil and a minority of the southern Muslim vote. This puts Rajapaksa in the 45% to 50% bracket; more if some voters in any of the groups counted in the previous paragraph throw him a lifeline.
OK, that’s enough for the numbers-game; my purpose, most emphatically, is not to attempt electoral predictions, it is insanely too early for that. Rather, the case I am making is this: Things are quite finely balanced and can swing either way. A real fight is on; therefore my objective in this numbers-game is only to insist that the opposition leaders, one and all, deserve to be certified as jointly and severally insane if they do not get their act together NOW.
Sectarian obstacles
Senior UNP MP Joseph Michael Perera made sensible conciliatory remarks according to a newspaper report: "We have not yet decided who our presidential candidate will be. We cannot do so since the election date has not been announced. A common candidate will be picked by a joint opposition front". This is tactically wise, though as the largest group by far, its pick of candidate will have to be endorsed by everybody who is serious about jettisoning Rajapaksa. So far so good, but uncertainty is contingent on Mr Perera’s next point: "The executive presidency is the cause of mounting problems in the post war era. It has to be scrapped if democracy and the rule of law are to be re-established; national security can be maintained under any system".
This indeed is the formula on which a winning common candidate can be ratified by the whole opposition; but the public at large, and this correspondent in particular, cannot banish lingering doubts. Does the UNP really mean it? Will it really abolish EP? Yes Ranil has said it a few times and Karu several times; I believe an internal UNP committee has endorsed it as policy. But still it has not been proclaimed from the rooftops; no statement issued as a policy charter, nor has a road map of the procedure been enunciated. The UNP has still not woken up to grasp that the most important step to stabilise a common opposition against the incumbent is a thunderous call to abolish EP.
The JVP is in something of a pickle because its cadres are unable to disentangle fundamentals from tactics; Anura Kumara and some leaders are probably clear about what to do eventually, but not in a position to get round the party as a whole, at least so it seems. Their concern is simple, the JVP cannot support Ranil, the class enemy, but it also sees that if defeating Rajapaksa is the priority, then there is no option but to work with the UNP. The dilemma is easy to resolve if they prioritise issues. The JVP needs to declare that it will support anybody, even a broomstick, even Ranil, if it is for a brief presidency for the sole purpose of abolishing EP. The UNP in its turn can lubricate this outcome by issuing a clear unambiguous and solemn pledge and a road-map promising this. It is all so obvious; you will appreciate why I say these all guys need to have their heads examined.
Post election pitfalls
Though the election will be violent, fraudulent and rigged, the worst may come afterwards; certainly if Rajapaksa rides again; even otherwise unless the winning opposition is mature and tolerant. If Rajapaksa wins by a large majority the UPFA terror machine will rampage again, drug dealers will have carte blanche, and what is there to stop kleptomania? The family will run amok romping through social and business circuits. If Rajapaksa only scrapes through, regime and state will be as stable as a pack of cards in a typhoon. Who will recognise the legitimacy of a Rajapakse who gets, say only 51% of the vote, in rigged elections? Such a regime cannot survive the ensuing civil unrest and open defiance.
More important is if Rajapaksa is defeated. When power-centralising rotten regimes, accused of gross rights violations, are thrown out, a turbulent power hiatus follows. A winning but diversified opposition must then act wisely and responsibly. The current regime has undermined ethnic, social and political cohesion, but it is not a worst case scenario like Libya after Gaddafi (a good friend of the Paksa family) or Iraq after the Americans destroyed the state and put nothing acceptable in its place. Even in monolithic China, rigid Stalinism has stoked rebellion in Xingjian, instability in Tibet and endemic protest in Hong Kong. The moral is: After a dictator, national cohesion has to be carefully reconstructed by the victorious democratic alliance.
The UNP, TNA, JVP and Fonseka do not dance to the same social and economic policy melody; that’s fine by me, that’s how it should be. However, it is crucial for them all to appreciate in the event of victory that we are passing through a very fragile period in world history. From the Middle East to the Far East, from Sub-Saharan Africa to the eastern borders of Russia, cracks can become chasms and swallow society in brutal conflict if not properly managed. Indian democracy is a fine example to learn from, but more important, the winning alliance right here must appreciate that it cannot let the country lapse into anarchic internecine conflict as has happened in Libya and Iraq.
Responsible democratic opposition is what the TNA and JVP must pledge if a common candidate wins with their support. Fonseka may take a portfolio (why not Defence?) but these two parties, I presume, will be in the parliamentary opposition. If the UNP forms the next government my place too will be in the democratic opposition. There is much essential democracy rebuilding to be done if we get rid of this regime. The opposition is the right place to be.
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