An
explanation often is worse than the presumed offence. Statements from Colombo
and Beijing this week on the frequent appearance of Chinese submarines and
ships at Sri Lankan ports are likely to worsen New Delhi’s concerns rather than
blunt them. Both Colombo and Beijing have countered India’s concerns by stating
that there is nothing unusual about Chinese naval visits to Lankan ports.
“It is an
international common practice for a navy submarine to stop for refuelling and
crew refreshment at an overseas port,” an official from China’s defence
ministry told China’s news agency Xinhua. A Sri Lankan navy spokesperson did
acknowledge the Chinese vessels’ arrival at the Colombo port last week. He said
“a submarine and a warship have docked at Colombo harbour” and added that this
is “nothing unusual”. “Since 2010, 230 warships have called at Colombo port
from various countries on goodwill visits and for refuelling and crew refreshment,”
the spokesman said.
Delhi’s
issue is not with the practice of international port calls in Lanka. The
problem for India is that China is not just another country. Given India’s
security problems with China on its northern frontiers, it is extremely
sensitive to potential Chinese naval presence on its maritime frontiers to the
south. Equally important is the nature of India’s own security partnership with
Sri Lanka. Delhi and Colombo have had a longstanding understanding that Lanka
will not allow foreign military presence on its territory that could be
inimical to Indian interests.
What
Colombo and Beijing are telling Delhi is that Chinese naval presence in Sri
Lanka is now routine and India should get used to it. Delhi quite clearly will
find it hard to digest.
BASES
AND PLACES
That
China’s naval profile in the Indian Ocean will continue to grow is now beyond
doubt. But the security establishment in Delhi has good reasons not to jump to
the conclusion that Sri Lanka is about to give a naval “base” to China.
First,
there is nothing to suggest that the PLA Navy is now looking at military bases
of the traditional kind, where a major power stations military personnel,
weapons and other equipment to allow combat operations from the territory of
another country. The proposition that China is acquiring a “string of pearls”,
or a series of military facilities, all across the Indian Ocean littoral has
gained considerable traction in India. The story on the ground is a little more
nuanced.
At this
juncture, China has focused on gaining access to “pit-stops” all across the
Indian Ocean littoral that will allow its navy to conduct “far sea operations”.
Since the end of 2008, the Chinese navy has been conducting counter-piracy
missions in the Gulf of Aden. Chinese naval squadrons on their way in and out
of the Gulf of Aden have been calling at a number of ports, including Colombo
and Karachi, in the subcontinent. China has recently acquired a resupply
facility in the Seychelles, located astride the sea lines of communication in
the western Indian Ocean. Analysts say that the Chinese navy could, in the near
term, move beyond commercial “pit-stops” and seek more reliable and durable
access to dual-use facilities that will make its operations in the Indian Ocean
more sustainable. The most likely place for such a dual-use facility could be
Karachi in Pakistan. Shared strategic interests, longstanding bilateral
military cooperation, the transfer of Chinese naval equipment and the
availability of facilities for repair and maintenance in Karachi could make
Pakistan the natural host nation for China’s first overseas naval facility.
COLOMBO CALCULUS How far Lanka might go in its naval collaboration with China
is linked to the nature of Delhi’s relations with Colombo. If Lanka is playing
the China card, Beijing is happy to take full advantage. What we don’t know is
how Delhi might respond if Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa overplayed
his hand. During his visit to Colombo last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping
announced plans to deepen defence cooperation with Sri Lanka. Xi also declared
that China will not interfere in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and will not
tolerate that by others (read India’s approach on the question of Tamil
minority rights in the island republic). Rajapaksa, in turn, has
enthusiastically endorsed China’s plans to build a Maritime Silk Road in the
Indian Ocean. If Delhi wants to limit or reverse Colombo’s strategic tilt
towards China, it should start with a comprehensive review of its policy
towards Sri Lanka.
The writer is a distinguished fellow
at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a contributing editor for ‘The
Indian Express’
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